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ARTICLE
THE COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONS
APPROACH TO WILDLIFE GOVERNANCE
by: Dean Lueck*
ABSTRACT
This Article develops a comparative institutions approach to wildlife governance by examining the property rights to the habitat and the stocks of wild
populations. The approach is based on the transaction cost and property
rights approach and lies primarily in the traditions of Coase, Barzel, Ostrom,
and Williamson. The approach recognizes the often-extreme costs of delineation and enforcement of property rights to wild populations and their habitats;
thus, all systems are notably imperfect compared to the typical neoclassical
economics approach. These costs arise because wildlife habitat and wildlife
populations are part of the land which has many attributes and uses—most
notably, residential and agricultural uses. In turn, the optimal ownership sizes
(and shapes) vary across land uses (e.g., farming, urban, ranching, wildlife,
parks). The organizations that govern wildlife tend to be ridden with transaction costs and imperfect property rights, and the most efficient system is one
that maximizes the total value of the package less the enforcement and administrative costs. This Article develops a framework for considering different
governance regimes for both the wild stocks and the habitats they require. A
series of cases—focused especially on bison and caribou—show the range of
governance regimes that have been used and how those governance regimes
depend on history and on law.
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If it was the common law that sheep and lambs belonged to nobody,
it would be impossible to preserve them from utter destruction. Each
man, when he saw a sheep or lamb, would take and sequester it for
his own use, lest his neighbor should get the start on him. There is no
common or statute law [in the United States] protecting fish and
game, therefore our fish and game are rapidly disappearing. What we
need is a law, not simply protecting game and fish. . . but making
game and fish the property of the owners of the land on which they
are found, and the streams through whose territory they run.

–Forest and Stream, 18751
I.

INTRODUCTION

The conservation and management of wildlife populations have
been governed by many organizations and legal regimes over time and
across space. Consider, for example, governance of the American bison (locally called the buffalo).2 Today, many bison are privately
owned like domestic cattle, but some are also under the administration of national park managers and state wildlife agencies where the
ownership is less clear. Prior to extensive European contact, Native
Americans governed bison as common property with enforcement of
hunting territories against other tribes and internal tribal rules about
hunting times and methods. During the nineteenth century, as the indigenous peoples were conquered, the bison stocks were subjected to
1. JAMES A. TOBER, WHO OWNS THE WILDLIFE?: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
CONSERVATION IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA, 122 (1981).
2. Dean Lueck, The Extermination and Conservation of the American Bison, 31 J.
LEGAL STUD. S609, S611 (2002) [hereinafter The Extermination and Conservation of
the American Bison] (examining the economic history of the bison).
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open-access depletion and nearly exterminated before they were governed largely as domestic animals under state agricultural laws.
Rangifer tarandus, or caribou, are governed as wild animals in
North America, only subject to full ownership upon harvest. In Europe, however, where caribou are called reindeer, they are partly domesticated and governed as private (sometimes communal) property.
Both are the same species, rangifer tarandus. This Article discusses
several of the many other examples of the same species differently
governed.
This Article develops a comparative institutions approach to wildlife governance by examining the property rights to the habitat and
the stocks of wild populations. The approach is based on the transaction cost and property rights approach and relies primarily on the traditions of Ronald Coase, Yoram Barzel, Elinor Ostrom, and Oliver
Williamson. The approach recognizes the often-extreme costs of delineation and enforcement of property rights to wild populations and
their habitats. All systems are notably imperfect compared to the typical neoclassical economics approach. These costs arise because wildlife habitat and wildlife populations are part of the land which has
many attributes and uses—most notably, residential and agricultural
uses. In turn, the optimal ownership sizes (and shapes) vary across
land uses (e.g., farming, urban, ranching, wildlife, parks). From this
point, it is easy to see that land with more than one characteristic (e.g.,
farm land and wildlife habitat or a watershed) will create property
regimes that may not match the geographic boundaries of habitats and
populations. Even where wildlife and its habitat are the only valued
characteristics of the land, the large scale may lead to large organizations effectively controlling the resources. These organizations will be
burdened by transaction costs and imperfect property rights, and the
most efficient system is one that maximizes the total value of the
package less the enforcement and administrative costs.
The economic framework in this Article uses the property rights
typology of Lueck and Miceli: open access, common property, private
property, and state property. Open access means there are no exclusive rights, while common property means exclusive group property.3
Common property has a rich history in wildlife governance (e.g., Ostrom 1990) and is the regime that best fits wildlife governed by
hunter-gatherer societies. Private property can include a mix of exclu3. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons 162 SCI. 1243, 1244 (1968) (discussing open access); see also ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE
EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 90–92 (1990) (noting that the
terms “common property” or “commons” had ancient use, meaning property held by
a well-defined group); see also Dean Lueck & Thomas J. Miceli, Property Law,
HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 239 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell
eds., vol. 1 2007) (highlighting the distinction between common property and open
access).
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sive property owned by individuals or private organizations.4 State
property is perhaps the most complex and can be administered in various ways that might mimic private ownership, common property, or
open access.
In Section II, I present an economic framework for considering different governance regimes for both the wild stocks and the habitat
they require. In Section III, I present a series of cases—focused especially on bison and caribou—that show the range of governance regimes that have been used and how those governance regimes depend
on history and on law.5 Section IV is a short conclusion.
II. GOVERNANCE

OF

HABITAT (LAND)

AND

POPULATIONS

The governance of wildlife requires analysis of the governance of
land (i.e., wildlife habitat) and governance of wildlife populations. I
begin by distinguishing the economic values of wild from domestic animals and reviewing basic bioeconomic models of harvest and use of
wild populations. I then develop a general framework for examining
landscape assets such as wildlife and focus on the particular governance regimes that predominate.
A. Some Basic Economics of Wildlife
Wild animals are distinguishable from domestic animals by the
property rights associated with the various species.6 Ownership is a
“key to understanding wildlife institutions and therefore the size and
sustainability of these populations.”7 A population or stock of animals
is completely wild only when there is open access.8 A stock is fully
domestic only when property rights to the stock are perfectly defined
and enforced.9 While populations (e.g., a herd of deer) or individuals
4. Note that common property and private property might become blurred in the
case where a private owner becomes a large organization. In Ostrom’s (1990) work,
common property typically referred to group property with relatively informal internal governance and often operating outside a formal legal system. OSTROM, supra
note 3.
5. It is apparent that under the zero transaction costs Coase Theorem, any wildlife governance structure would yield identical outcomes. See generally Prateek
Agarwal, The Coase Theorem, INTELLIGENT ECONOMIST (Jan. 1, 2018), https://
www.intelligenteconomist.com/the-coase-theorem/ [https://perma.cc/R9RS-JRB9]. Indeed, the evidence presented here implies that transaction costs are substantial and
lead to wide variation in wildlife governance and wildlife allocation.
6. Dean Lueck, Property Rights and the Economic Logic of Wildlife Institutions,
35 NAT. RESOURCES J. 625, 635 (1995) [hereinafter Property Rights and the Economic
Logic of Wildlife Institutions]; Dean Lueck, Wildlife: Sustainability and Management,
PERSPECTIVES ON SUSTAINABLE RESOURCES IN AMERICA 133, 137 (Roger A. Sedjo
ed., 2010) [hereinafter PERSPECTIVES ON SUSTAINABLE RESOURCES IN AMERICA].
7. Property Rights and the Economic Logic of Wildlife Institutions, supra note 6,
at 635.
8. Id.
9. Id.
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(e.g., a trained tiger) can be owned, the focus is on ownership of populations and other aggregations of individuals.10
One can also consider wild versus domestic in terms of the animals’
habitats and behaviors.11 The more natural the habitat, the wilder the
animals.12 In everyday usage “wild” implicates ownership and
habitat.13 Ownership therefore affects animal behavior (and ultimately biology) by altering the natural parameters of the animals
face.14 Humans also affect the population even without ownership because open-access exploitation can cause, among other things, overharvest.15
The net value of a wild population depends on the gross value it
generates and the costs of generating it.16 “A stock of wildlife is valued for products derived from its carcass, which requires killing individuals, and from services derived from living animals, including
ecosystem services.17 Costs arise, in the form of damage to other resources, because animals consume resources in their day-to-day
lives.”18 Ducks and geese feast on small grains, elk and deer forage in
hay fields, and mountain lions attack sheep, pets, and even people.19
There are well-established markets for animal products such as
feathers, flesh, hides, and pelts.20 For a market transaction, property
rights to some of the attributes of the product must be well-specified;
10. See id. at 627.
11. Id. at 635. There are often important, but subtle, biological factors that influence the cost of ownership of animals. For example, Indian elephants have been domesticated but African elephants have not. See generally JULIET CLUTTON–BROCK,
DOMESTICATED ANIMALS FROM EARLY TIMES (1981) (discussing the domestication
of wild populations); LEE ALAN DUGATKIN & LYUDMILA TRUT, HOW TO TAME A
FOX (AND BUILD A DOG): VISIONARY SCIENTISTS AND A SIBERIAN TALE OF JUMPSTARTED EVOLUTION ( 2017) (studying the domestication of foxes in Siberia); CAROL
O. SAUER, AGRICULTURAL ORIGINS AND DISPERSALS (1952); FRIEDRICH ZUENER, A
HISTORY OF DOMESTICATED ANIMALS (1963).
12. Property Rights and the Economic Logic of Wildlife Institutions, supra note 6,
at 635.
13. Id.
14. Id.; PERSPECTIVES ON SUSTAINABLE RESOURCES IN AMERICA, supra note 6, at
137.
15. Property Rights and the Economic Logic of Wildlife Institutions, supra note 6,
at 635.
16. Id. at 636; PERSPECTIVES ON SUSTAINABLE RESOURCES IN AMERICA, supra
note 6, at 138.
17. PERSPECTIVES ON SUSTAINABLE RESOURCES IN AMERICA, supra note 6, at
138.
18. Id.
19. Id. For example, a mountain biker was stalked and killed by a mountain lion
near North Bend, WA. Erik Lacitis, 1 Bicyclist Dead, 1 Hurt in Cougar Attack Near
Snoqualmie, SEATTLE TIMES (last updated May 20, 2018, 4:18 PM), https://
www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/eastside/1-dead-1-injured-in-cougar-attack-oneastside/ [https://perma.cc/AW79-F6DC].
20. Property Rights and the Economic Logic of Wildlife Institutions, supra note 6,
at 636.
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this is true for meat, hides, and pelts.21 Live animals are valuable because not only can they provide these products in the future but also
during their lifetime they periodically provide antlers, manure, power,
and wool. Simply their existence can also produce aesthetic value for
those who view or photograph them.22 Wild populations can also potentially provide a wide variety of ecosystem services.
B. Governance Regimes and Wildlife Exploitation
Wildlife populations are renewable biological resources, and some
basic elements of population dynamics are important for understanding wildlife economics and governance. Panel A of Figure 1 shows the
basic features of biological growth.23 A population tends to grow
slowly at first, then rapidly, then ultimately slowing down as it reaches
its maximum level or its “carrying capacity” (routinely labeled K) for
a given habitat.24 The panel plots the size of the population against the
rate of growth of the population, showing there is no growth when the
stock is zero or at the carrying capacity.
FIGURE 1
Panel A: Stock-Growth Relationship

21. Id.
22. Id.
23. See infra Figure 1.
24. Carrying Capacity, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/
science/carrying-capacity (last visited June 14, 2018) [https://perma.cc/M4CMEQEM]. A more complex and real population model would incorporate uncertainty.
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Panel B: Optimal Harvest of Wildlife Population

When the population growth rate is largest (A), it is said to be at
“maximum sustainable yield” level, or “MSY.”25 Therefore, at MSY
(XMSY) the largest possible level of harvest could be sustained indefinitely because growth would exactly offset it.26 At a carrying capacity,
however, the sustainable harvest is zero because the net growth rate is
zero.27 Thus, the simple features of biological growth show that population levels must be reduced from carrying capacity to increase sustainable harvest.28
The economic problem is determining the optimal level of harvest.
Property rights are important in determining effort, harvest (or preservation), stock size, and wealth generated from the stock.29 If secure
property rights to a population exist, the owner typically “harvest[s]
an entire cohort at the same time and then restock[s] the habitat with
another population.”30 For wildlife, the issue is the level of harvest in
25. PERSPECTIVES ON SUSTAINABLE RESOURCES IN AMERICA, supra note 6, at
138.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Property Rights and the Economic Logic of Wildlife Institutions, supra note 6,
at 638.
30. PERSPECTIVES ON SUSTAINABLE RESOURCES IN AMERICA, supra note 6, at
139. This is what economists call an optimal timing problem, and it is the framework
that describes everything from timber cutting to grain harvest. This is the case for
domestic cattle as well as for aquaculture. In addition, strong property rights give the
owner an incentive to invest in habitat (changing K) or changing population dynamics
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a period, such as a year or a season.31 This kind of regime can be
found where populations are owned or where there is open access. If
property rights are secure, the owner will choose the optimal amount
of harvest each period.32 The bottom panel of Figure 1 uses the biological production process shown in the top panel of Figure 133 and
couples it with market prices and costs of harvest to generate harvest
outcomes under various property regimes.34 The horizontal axis measures harvest effort (e.g., labor, equipment), and the vertical axis measures the revenues and costs of effort in dollars.35 The total revenue
(TR) curve denotes the market value associated with various levels of
effort in yielding a harvest (e.g., bison meat) that can be sold in competitive markets.36 The horizontal axis also shows that the wildlife
stock size is directly and inversely linked to harvest effort.37 When
there is no effort, the stock is at carrying capacity and declines as effort increases. Under private ownership of the stock, the owner
chooses the optimal level of effort (E*) and earns a periodic rent (R)
from this management.38 Under private ownership, the total value of
the stock will be the discounted present value of this stream of rents.
Under open access, the level of harvest is excessive because each
user does not bear the cost his or her harvest imposes on the size and
productivity of the population.39 Effort is exerted to Eoa which exceeds E*. If the marginal harvest costs are low, open access can lead
to extreme reductions in population and even extinction.40 Indeed,
open-access exploitation is “a dominant cause of the many dramatic
(e.g., growth rates) themselves through animal husbandry (e.g., selective breeding,
medicine). See Robert S. Pindyck, Optimal Timing Problems in Environmental Economics, 26 J. ECON. DYNAMICS & CONTROL 1677, 1678 (2002).
31. Of course, the optimal number need not be constant over time as conditions
change.
32. PERSPECTIVES ON SUSTAINABLE RESOURCES IN AMERICA, supra note 6, at
140. This would include cases in which the population provided public goods because
perfect property rights would still allow the owner to exclude.
33. See supra Figure 1.
34. JON M. CONRAD, RESOURCE ECONOMICS (2d ed. 2010) (explaining this model
in detail).
35. Supra Figure 1.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. The rent is the revenue less the costs at the optimal level of effort, or TR(E*) –
TC(E*).
39. Suboptimal use can also occur when investment is required for harvest; in this
case, an open access regime can lead to under-exploitation. This has been a problem
in oil production but less so in wildlife management. See generally Henning Bohn &
Robert T. Deacon, Ownership Risk, Investment, and the Use of Natural Resources, 90
AM. ECON. REV. 526, 532–47 (2000).
40. It is not essential that X equal zero when the growth rate is zero; there may be
a “minimum viable stock size” required to ensure positive growth rates, which makes
extinction more likely. Note, however, that extinction of a single stock is not the same
as biological extinction of a species, as a species is composed of many stocks. See
generally Michael R. Caputo & Dean Lueck, Natural Resource Exploitation Under
Common Property Rights, 16 NAT. RESOURCE MODELING 39, 40–46 (2003).
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population reductions and extinctions.”41 Additionally, the rent (and
its present value equivalent) is dissipated by overexploitation.42 Thus,
not only is the wildlife resource damaged, but little or no economic
value is generated from it.
As Ostrom notes, common property regimes can generate rents by
reducing open access harvest levels.43 In a wildlife harvest model,
common property wildlife exploitation can lead to intermediate levels
of effort and eliminates open access rent dissipation.44 As Figure 1,
Panel B shows, if effort is between E* and Eoa, positive rents are generated, and the stock size is larger than under open access. This model
can be used to approximate the implicit property rights held by
hunter-gatherer peoples around the world.45
C. Property Rights to Land and Wildlife
The property-rights regimes that govern wildlife are intimately
linked to property rights to land, and, in general, ownership patterns
of land do not coincide with the habitat requirements of wildlife populations.46 In modern societies, land ownership patterns tend not to be
determined by wildlife use but rather by agriculture (e.g., farms,
ranches), mining, and commercial forestry. “If a wildlife population
were the only valuable resource tied to a parcel of land, the value of
the land would be maximized when land ownership coincided with the
population’s territory.47 In this situation, a landowner would implicitly
own the wildlife population and have incentive to maximize its value
by choosing the optimal level of use and population size.”48 In this
case, wildlife would be quite economically similar to domestic animals,
although the habitat would still be “natural.” Usually, however, wildlife is not the only valuable use of land, and the analysis is not so
clear-cut.49
41. PERSPECTIVES ON SUSTAINABLE RESOURCES IN AMERICA, supra note 6, at
140.
42. Id.
43. ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION, 48–49 (1990).
44. Caputo & Lueck, supra note 40, at 45.
45. When non-consumptive values (i.e., values from the living stock, not harvest)
dominate, a private owner may optimally choose to limit harvest or to not harvest at
all. However, because many such uses (e.g., viewing, scientific research) are public
goods, a private owner will have to overcome free-riding problems, which may depend on the owner’s ability to enforce his property rights.
46. The problem of game ownership is analytically similar to other large-scale
landscape resources such as oil and gas reservoirs or groundwater basins. Property
Rights and the Economic Logic of Wildlife Institutions, supra note 6, at 638 n.46.
47. PERSPECTIVES ON SUSTAINABLE RESOURCES IN AMERICA, supra note 6, at
140.
48. Id.
49. Id.
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Figure 2 shows two possible scenarios that illustrate some fundamental issues. Both panels of Figure 2 show a square piece of land
with a circular area inside indicating a wildlife habitat area.
For simplicity, assume the wildlife use all portions of the habitat
equally.50 In the left panel (A), there is only one landowner.51 In the
right panel (B), there are seventeen different landowners with tracts
of different sizes.52 Consequently, the landowner in panel (A) accrues
all costs and benefits that come from the wildlife, excluding non-local
values, such as existence value.53 In panel (B), however, no one landowner faces the full costs and benefits.54 Each landowner has an incentive to harvest animals that occupy their own tracts before they
move on; thus no one has a strong incentive to improve the habitat.55
FIGURE 2
Wildlife Ownership and Landowner Contracting
Wildlife

Private Property

Public Property

(A)

(B)

(C)

(D)

Sometimes wildlife values supersede agricultural and land use values and, accordingly, determine the land’s ownership pattern. If wildlife is the land’s most valued attribute, the wildlife manager would be
the land’s most efficient owner. The governing property rights for
many aboriginal hunting and gathering societies fits this case.56 In
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id. at 141.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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those cases, property rights were designed to protect valuable wild
populations that required greater territories than did agriculture. As
discussed below, for example, the bison hunting tribes of the Great
Plains defined their property rights to land largely in terms of expansive bison habitat.
The landowners can contract to jointly manage the wildlife. This
would solve the problem of establishing ownership to wildlife populations whose habitat encompasses many landowners.57 The landowners’ abilities to establish rights to wildlife on their property depends
on their incentive to resolve the conflict between the territorial requirements of a wild population and the optimal tract size of land
used for other purposes.58 Generally, it is more likely that it will be in
the interest of the private landowners to assert rights to wildlife where
wildlife values are highest, where the land is more productive (or of a
better quality) for wildlife, where land holdings are large, and where
the territorial requirement of wildlife is small.59 Accordingly, where
these conditions are not met, it is more likely that governments will
assert control over wildlife.60
D. Governing Landscape Assets
The wildlife contracting problem is an example of the more general
problem of governing landscape assets.61 Oil-gas reservoirs and
groundwater aquifers are landscape assets that often lie under many
small and heterogeneous surface-rights holders. Airsheds, watersheds,
and viewsheds, like wildlife stocks, are landscape assets that overlie
surface holdings.62 History and law can generate different governance
regimes for such landscape assets, including wildlife.63
A starting point is a natural “landscape” that is unowned and
(mostly) unused. The landscape might be an asset such as wildlife
habitat, a watershed, a canyon, or even underground assets such as
groundwater or an oil reservoir. The landscape is “large” in the sense
that the area within the landscape can potentially be used for other
assets that would require a much smaller scale of control. For example, the landscape might be an isolated mountain range that could also
be used for cattle grazing in relatively small ranches. It might also be a
floodplain potentially used by hundreds of small farmers. This Article’s framework incorporates a variety of observed governance regimes including: a) sole ownership of the landscape by a private party;
57. Id. at 141–42.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. See Karen Bradshaw Schulz & Dean Lueck, Contracting for Control of Landscape-Level Resources, 100 IOWA L. REV. 2507, 2511 (2015).
62. See id. at 2512.
63. Id. at 2529–43.
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b) cooperative landscape control by private owners of small-scale assets; c) small-scale landowners contract with an agent to manage the
landscape; d) state control of the landscape with retention of private
control of the small-scale assets;64 e) mixed control of the landscape
by state and private parties; and f) state control of the landscape and
both the large- and small-scale assets.65
The landscape of size in acres (L) has two assets: s is a “small-scale”
asset (e.g., farmland), and l is a “large-scale” asset (e.g., wildlife
habitat) whose acreage is exactly L.66 The total value of the landscape
depends on the value of output from the two assets; that is, V=V(s,l).67
This net value will depend on the path of ownership and how the law
structures that path.
Figure 3 summarizes the pathways of contracting and the ways in
which history and law can affect outcomes. The two paths depend on
the relative value of the two assets that comprise the landscape—the
landscape-level assets (e.g., the bison habitat) and the small-scale assets (e.g., farms and ranches). The upper path shows how ownership is
initially established at the landscape level and the lower path shows
that ownership is initially established at the small-scale level.
As the figure shows, the natural starting point is a natural area of
size L with two assets, s and l, and three stages of ownership. In Stage
1 the choice is to either establish property rights to the small-scale
asset (lower path) or to leave the entire area as open access (upper
path). The choice to demarcate would depend on the value of the land
in the small-scale use.68 The open access path is the default case in
which no human property institutions are created.

64. This control could be achieved through laws, servitudes, or regulations. See id.
at 2513.
65. I ignore such complications as a landscape with more than two assets, uncertainty about the size or location of the landscape, or heterogeneity within the
landscape.
66. Dean Lueck & Dominic Parker, The Origins and Extent of Environmental
Agencies (working paper, 2018).
67. If there are two assets with the same scale, the landscape “problem” vanishes.
68. Gary D. Libecap & Dean Lueck, The Demarcation of Land and the Role of
Coordinating Property Institutions, 119 J. POL. ECON. 426, 435–36 (2011).
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FIGURE 3
Decision Tree for Landscape Control

Open access
to area.

Landscape asset is
optimally managed
(e.g., hunter gatherer
territories).
Landscape asset
remains open
access.

Contractual
state/regulatory
regime to control
the landscape.

Natural Area

Area wide
demarcation of
ownership to small
scale asset.

Stage 1

Landscape asset is
optimally managed
(e.g., utilized oil-gas
reservoir).
Small landholders
treat large
landscape as open
access (e.g.,
overhunting).

State or regulatory
regime to control
the landscape.

Stage 2

Stage 3

From each of these two nodes, there are two possible paths in Stage
2. Both paths assume the large-scale asset becomes more valuable.
The upper path from the open access node depicts a case in which an
initial large-scale claim (size l) is made effectively establishing ownership of the entire landscape69 while the lower path depicts a case in
which the landscape remains open access because claiming is too
costly. This can result in overuse as in the fisheries or wildlife harvest
case or underuse as in the case in which investment is important.70
The figure also shows the potential for private contractual control or
for state or regulatory control to emerge.71
There are also two paths from the small-scale asset demarcation
node. The upper path indicates successful contracting among the
small-scale parties to control the large-scale asset. The lower path indicates contractual failure among these parties so that the large-scale
asset effectively remains an open access resource. The figure also
shows the potential for state or regulatory control to emerge from
contractual failures.
The path taken and its outcome depend on the costs and benefits of
private contracting and on the costs of enforcing claims at different
scales. The benefits depend on the values of the two assets. The costs
depend on the number of small-scale parties that have rights to the
larger landscape (s/L) and on the legal rules that govern the contracting process. Legal rules can affect these outcomes by necessitat69. I ignore the issue of small-scale assets within this landscape.
70. See generally Bohn & Deacon, supra note 39.
71. GARY D. LIBECAP, CONTRACTING FOR PROPERTY RIGHTS (1989).
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ing the choice of demarcation, by affecting the size and types of
parcels, and by explicitly structuring the rule for private contracting.72
III.

CASE STUDIES

IN

WILDLIFE GOVERNANCE

This Section examines several cases of wildlife governance that rely
on the above framework.73 The case studies show a range of governance regimes and history of those regimes. I focus on governance of
bison and caribou, two large iconic mammals that have inhabited the
Northern Hemisphere for millennia.
A. England versus America
Comparing England and America reveals how history and the natural landscape features can influence wildlife governance. The ecological character of wildlife and the pattern of land ownership in Great
Britain and the United States were distinct during the crucial period
of the nineteenth century when wildlife institutions in both countries
were solidifying.74 Private landholdings in the United States in the
nineteenth century were small and widely dispersed. But in England,
landholdings were relatively large and concentrated, and the government did not hold much land.75
The wildlife stocks that inhabit the two countries also differ in important respects. For example, North American waterfowl typically
nest during the summer in Alaska and northern Canada and migrate
to Mexico and the southern states for the winter.76 By contrast, most
British waterfowl are not migratory, even though the types of species
present are nearly identical to those in the United States.77 North
America is inhabited by many relatively large wide-ranging herbivores
such as bison, deer, elk, moose, mountain goat, and pronghorn antelope, and by carnivores such as bear, cougar, coyote, and wolf—all of
which require rather large territories.78 Except for the red deer, wideranging herbivores and carnivores are not currently in Great Britain.79
72. Compulsory unitization statutes are an example of law that lowers the costs of
contracting among small-scale asset owners to create ownership of the large-scale
asset.
73. See Bradshaw & Lueck, supra note 61 (using a similar framework to examine a
wide range of natural resources).
74. Dean Lueck, The Economic Nature of Wildlife, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 291, 292–93
(1989) [hereinafter The Economic Nature of Wildlife].
75. Id. I discuss the rationale for the United States system in detail. See generally
id.; Dean Lueck, Ownership and Regulation of Wildlife, 29 ECON. INQUIRY 249
(1991); Dean Lueck & Dominic Parker, The Origins and Extent of Environmental
Agencies (forthcoming 2018).
76. PERSPECTIVES ON SUSTAINABLE RESOURCES IN AMERICA, supra note 6, at
146.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
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Many of the large mammalian species native to Great Britain (and the
rest of Europe) became extinct before modern nations emerged.80
American wildlife law, which frames management institutions, has
origins in English common law. But for wildlife, present-day American and English law differ sharply. In the United States, the law places
most control of wildlife in the hands of state governments. In Great
Britain, the law places dominant control in the hands of private
landowners.
By the mid-nineteenth century, however, American law differed
from its English origins.81 Property-rights institutions among American Indians during this period were largely replaced by state restrictions on takings (or harvest) beginning in the early 1800s.82 The
earliest state controls simply restricted the time of year during which it
was legal to kill game. When these restrictions were contested, numerous courts bolstered the states’ authorities to regulate the taking and
trading of wildlife.83 Courts consistently upheld state wildlife
regulations.84
Today, states predominantly regulate wildlife control and use, typically vested in a state “fish and game” or “wildlife” agency.85 The key
components of modern game laws and regulations, administered and
enforced by game departments, include seasonal restrictions (and
sometimes prohibitions) on taking wildlife, prohibiting or severely restricting game trade, licensing requirements for legally taking game,
and restricting the methods by which animals may be taken.86 Game
departments also administer state wildlife refuges and undertake research (e.g., population surveys, re-stocking programs).87
Wildlife property-rights assignments in England and the United
States reflect the disparity in land ownership and wildlife ecology between the two countries.88 During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, English landowners had a comparative advantage in wildlife
ownership that landowners in the United States did not.89
80. Id.
81. MICHAEL J. BEAN, THE EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL WILDLIFE LAW 12–17
(1983); The Economic Nature of Wildlife, supra note 74, at 295.
82. PERSPECTIVES ON SUSTAINABLE RESOURCES IN AMERICA, supra note 6, at
144.
83. Id.
84. Id.; see, e.g., Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 535 (1896).
85. Property Rights and the Economic Logic of Wildlife Institutions, supra note 6,
at 633.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 648. The regulation of fisheries in the two countries is also supportive. In
America, the government generally controls fisheries, but state laws ordinarily grant
private control of fish in small lakes and private ponds. In Great Britain, however,
private fishing rights are very common on the numerous, and rather small, countryside streams. At the same time, the Crown has long controlled the fisheries in open
seas, navigable rivers, and the foreshore. Id. at 648 n.62.
89. Id. at 648.
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B. Wildlife and Native Americans
American Indian tribes specified rights to live wildlife stocks by
protecting hunting and fishing territories.90 Native American game
ownership bared an uncanny resemblance to current American institutions.91 “[American] Indian tribal societies, much like state agencies,
controlled wildlife stocks by enforcing the rights to hunting and fishing territories and restricting the time and method of harvest by tribal
members.”92 But “most often, rights to game were held as ‘common
property’ among members of relatively small tribal units.”93 Bailey
finds similar arrangements for tribal groups outside of North
America.94 Native Americans found it difficult, if not impossible, to
enforce their property rights to these regions as whites introduced agriculture and industry to the New World and caused the relative value
of the land’s wildlife attributes to decline drastically.95 “During this
period of open access[,] ‘market hunting’ flourished[,] and many wildlife populations in the United States plummeted.”96 There were wellestablished rights and markets for game products such as meat and
hides, but rights to live wildlife stocks were practically nonexistent.97
Today, Native Americans have jurisdiction over wildlife on their reservation lands and outcomes vary: some are governed as near-open
access while some generate revenues.
C. Bison and Caribou
Bison bison (the American Bison) is a large herbivore also known
as the buffalo.98 Before Europeans colonized North America, there
may have been 30 million bison or more. But by 1900, bison were
reduced to approximately 1,000 animals.99 Since that time, bison
populations have increased to over one-half million animals inhabiting
national parks and refuges, American Indian reservations, and private
90. Id. at 630.
91. Id.; PERSPECTIVES ON SUSTAINABLE RESOURCES IN AMERICA, supra note 6, at
142.
92. Property Rights and the Economic Logic of Wildlife Institutions, supra note 6,
at 630; PERSPECTIVES ON SUSTAINABLE RESOURCES IN AMERICA, supra note 6, at
142; Martin J. Bailey, Approximate Optimality of Aboriginal Property Rights, 35 J. L.
& ECON. 183, 195 (1992) (finding similar institutions for the Aborigine hunter-gatherer society).
93. Property Rights and the Economic Logic of Wildlife Institutions, supra note 6,
at 630 n.11; PERSPECTIVES ON SUSTAINABLE RESOURCES IN AMERICA, supra note 6,
at 167.
94. Bailey, supra note 92, at 186.
95. Property Rights and the Economic Logic of Wildlife Institutions, supra note 6,
at 630.
96. Id.; PERSPECTIVES ON SUSTAINABLE RESOURCES IN AMERICA, supra note 6, at
143.
97. Id.
98. The Economic Nature of Wildlife Law, supra note 74, at 315.
99. The Extermination and Conservation of the American Bison, supra note 2, at
S610.
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lands. Generally, state laws that cover domestic livestock cover bison
populations, so they are not typically treated as wildlife nor are they
under the purview of state wildlife agencies.100 Rangifer tarandus,
known as caribou in North America and reindeer in Europe, is a medium-sized deer that inhabits the northern reaches of the Northern
Hemisphere.101 Rangifer has been domesticated to various degrees in
Europe and governed by pastoral societies, including the Saami people in Scandinavia. But in North America, Rangifer is now primarily
governed by state and provincial wildlife laws. Figure 4 summarizes
the wide range of regimes that have governed these two species.
FIGURE 4
Cases in Wildlife Governance
Bison/Buffalo
Hunter-Gatherer
Governance

Habitat Ownership
Tribal common
property.

American Prairie
Reserve
Caribou/Reindeer
US-Canada
Hunter Gatherer prewhite contact

Private and public
land
Habitat Ownership

Population Ownership Outcomes
Tribal common
Sustainable
property.
subsistence harvest,
culture tied to bison.
Tribal common
Sustainable native
property.
hunting, trading with
whites.
Open access with
Increased open access.
some private herds.
Some livestock.
Private ranchers,
Bison used as
government agencies, livestock. Some
tribes (recent).
common ownership.
U.S. Federal
Limited use, herds
government.
managed for
conservation.
Private ownership of ???
bison
Population Ownership Outcomes

Indigenous tribal
common property.

Indigenous tribal
common property.

Agency Management

Native corporations,
private lands, public
lands (State and
national).
Native lands/
corporations, private
and public lands.

Subsistence hunters,
state and national
governments.

Sami families
Sami in pasture areas,
Sami and non-Sami in
Concession Zones.
Public lands, some
private land.
Predominantly public
property, some private
property.

Sami families
Sami and non-Sami

Northern Plains Robe Tribal common
Hunt
property.
19th Century Open
Access
20th Century –
Present
Yellowstone National
Park

Porcupine Caribou
Herd
Europe
Sami Siida
Pasture Management
Wild
Reindeer in Russia

Private and public
lands.
Private lands, public
lands (state/federal),
tribal reservations.
Public land.

Subsistence hunters,
state and national
agencies

Subsistence hunting.
Communally owned
wildlife and territory
Sustainable herd
management.
Sustainable herd
management.

Sustainable use.
Common property
and private property
use mix.
Norwegian
Sustainable
government
management.
Predominantly public Public and private
property, some private management conflict.
property.

100. Id. at S646.
101. STEPHEN DEMARAIS & PAUL R. KRAUSMAN, ECOLOGY & MANAGEMENT
LARGE MAMMALS IN NORTH AMERICA 658–63 (2000).
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1. Bison: Hunter-Gatherer Governance
Prior to European settlement of North America, bison and their
habitat were governed by institutions best understood as common
property regimes by nomadic Native American tribes.102 While bison
were sometimes hunted by village-dwelling tribes, due to their nomadic nature, bison were mostly hunted by tribes such as the Sioux or
the Crow on the Great Plains, who moved with the bison herds. Indeed, Great Plains tribal organization mirrored that of the bison:
small groups congregated in the winter and spring, and large groups
congregated in the summer and early fall.103 Before the establishment
of robe and hide markets in the nineteenth century, these tribes
hunted the bison for their subsistence.
2. Bison: The Robe Hunt on the Northern Plains
The establishment of trading posts along the Missouri River and
Canadian border facilitated trade between the Native Americans for
many wildlife products including bison robes.104 From 1820 to 1880,
white traders purchased robes (heavy winter hides) from American
Indian hunters.105 “Numerous reporters indicate that robe harvests
shipped out of the Upper Missouri region (North Dakota and Montana) averaged between 50,000 and 100,000 robes [annually] for nearly
60 years.”106 This robe market existed only on the Northern Plains
where cold winters led bison to develop the heaviest and most valuable coats. The robe market led to an increase in bison harvest, but this
short-lived market had little overall impact on bison population and
no impact on bison habitat.107 The robe market can be characterized
as being governed by common property for roughly the first forty
years and then by open access for the last fifteen.108 Two important
features of the robe trade distinguished it from the hide trade that
followed. “First, the robe trade occurred mostly during a period (pre1880s) when the land had no valuable alternative uses, so the carrying
capacity of the habitat was not being reduced.”109 Second, the optimal
102. American Indians living in the eastern forests were often engaged in agriculture and thus tended to have property rights to land defined over relatively small
territories. In this setting, bison population were essentially open access.
103. The Extermination and Conservation of the American Bison, supra note 2, at
S631.
104. Id. at S619.
105. Id. at S632.
106. Id.
107. Id. at S632–33. Contra Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights,
57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 352 (1967) (finding introduction of the beaver hide market
changed governance regimes among the Montaigne Indians).
108. Id. at S632
109. Id. at S633.
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time to hunt bison for robes was only in the late fall and early winter
when the robes were prime.110
3. Bison: Open Access Extirpation, 1850–1900
American expansion across and into the Great Plains began in earnest after 1850 and tribal governance of habitat and populations
eroded quickly, effectively creating open access to the bison populations. This occurred even as bison habitat became privatized into relatively small holdings for farms and ranches that were much too small
to control the territory of bison populations. Railroads and new longrange rifles lowered the cost of access and harvest, and the introduction of the hide market to eastern and European markets caused a
rapid open-access depletion from 1870 to 1885. During this period, the
exploitation of bison on the Great Plains transitioned generally into
the hands of white hunters as most natives were either relocated to
reservations or killed in conflicts with the American soldiers and settlers. Still, the last large herd of bison in the great plains was actually
wiped out in what is now southwest North Dakota by a Sioux hunting
party in 1883. By 1890, the bison were nearly extinct, reduced to
roughly 1,000 animals at scattered locations including Yellowstone
National Park, which was created in 1876 before the last great herds
were extirpated.111 “Although direct measures of the extent of rent
dissipation are not available, Isenberg’s discussion of the hide hunters’
fate is consistent with open access and rent dissipation: ‘Euroamericans waged a scorched-earth campaign against the [American] Indians
who impeded the expansion of industry. Yet the hide hunters’ victory
was hollow; when the campaign was over, most of the hunters found
themselves no wealthier than before.’”112 This description of bison
hide-hunting is similar to open-access exploitation by a group of homogeneous hunters with low opportunity costs.113
110. J.A. ALLEN, THE AMERICAN BISONS, LIVING AND EXTINCT 59 (1876) (explaining that November through January are the prime months for robes). Robes
were also costlier to prepare than hides.
111. The Extermination and Conservation of the American Bison, supra note 2, at
S611.
112. ANDREW C. ISENBERG, THE DESTRUCTION OF THE BISON: AN ENVIRONMENTAL HISTORY, 1750–1920 163 (2000). “There was also a small market for meat for
railroad workers and settlers. For example, William “Buffalo Bill” Cody became famous as a hunter hired by Kansas Pacific in 1867 and killed 4,280 bison. But this had
little effect beyond the travel corridors. For example, Dodge accounts to settlers killing just 150,000 compared to 3.7 million killed in 1870–1874 for hides. During the hide
trade, there was a limited amount of meat shipped east, but it was generally too costly
to transport from a kill site to the railroad. After 1872, small amounts were shipped in
refrigerated cars.” The Extermination and Conservation of the American Bison, supra
note 2, at S620, S634–35 n.83.
113. The Extermination and Conservation of the American Bison, supra note 2, at
S635; Peter J. Hill, Are All Commons Tragedies?: The Case of Bison in the Nineteenth
Century, 18 INDEP. R. 485, 487–88 (2014).
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4. Bison: Private Governance, 1900–Present
During the period of the open-access hide market, a few private
ranchers explored the possibility of profitably raising bison. Charles
Goodnight captured three calves to start a herd in 1866 in Texas, and
William and Charles Alloway captured three calves and James McKay
captured five calves to start herds between 1872 and 1874 in Canada.114 The famous Pablo-Allard Herd began when a Pend d’Oreille
Indian named Walking Coyote captured several calves in central Montana in 1873.115 Walking Coyote led the calves back to the Flathead
Valley in western Montana where the herd thrived.116 The Pablo-Allard Herd led to the establishment of herds in parks and on ranches
during the twentieth century.117
In 1905, Ernest Baynes and William Hornaday founded the American Bison Society, instigating the eventual appropriation of federal
funding to establish parks and refuges to protect and grow bison
populations.118 The American Bison Society purchased bison and
donated them to herds on public lands, such as the National Bison
Range in western Montana—not far from where the Pablo-Allard
Herd once thrived.119 After these public herds grew, the American
Bison Society disbanded in 1935, and the bison on public lands were
placed under the arm of various federal agencies, such as the Fishing
and Wildlife Service or the National Park Service.120
Because the bison populations in most states were at or near zero,
bison were not governed by the new state wildlife laws that emerged
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.121 Outside Yel114. The Extermination and Conservation of the American Bison, supra note 2, at
S645; Time Line of the American Bison, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., https://
www.fws.gov/bisonrange/timeline.htm (last visited June 18, 2018) [https://perma.cc/
V899-PRM5].
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. At this time, the Pablo-Allard herd was one of the largest private herds, totaling 700 animals. Id. Many regulations before 1900 meant to conserve bison or their
harvest often came too late, usually after extirpation on the state level. See id. For
example, in 1864, the Idaho legislature enacted laws protecting the bison, but bison no
longer existed in the state. Id.
118. The Extermination and Conservation of the American Bison, supra note 2, at
S613; see also Time Line of the American Bison, supra note 114.
119. Bison: American Buffalo (Bison Bison), U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., https://
www.fws.gov/refuge/national_bison_range/wildlife_and_habitat/bison.html (last updated May 11, 2018) [https://perma.cc/6K2L-MGG7].
120. Time Line of the American Bison, supra note 114.
121. See THEODORE A. BOOKHOUT, THE NORTH AMERICAN MODEL OF WILDLIFE
CONSERVATION 3 (2012), http://wildlife.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/North-American-model-of-Wildlife-Conservation.pdf [https://perma.cc/UZ3A-5DNC]; Shannon
Petersen, Bison to Blue Whales: Protecting Endangered Species Before the Endangered Species Act of 1973, 22 ENVIRONS: ENVTL. L. & POL’Y J. 71, 74–75.
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lowstone National Park, bison were on private lands122 and were thus
governed by the law of domestic livestock like cattle, sheep, and pigs.
Bison could therefore be bought, sold, and transported like cattle, and
owners had the same rights, duties, and obligations as cattle owners.
Under this legal regime, both private and public bison herds increased.123 Of the approximate 500,000 bison now inhabiting North
America, the vast majority are privately owned and inhabit private
lands in the United States and Canada.124 In recent decades, some
Native American tribes have reestablished bison herds on their reservation lands.125
5. Bison: Yellowstone National Park
Yellowstone National Park was created in 1872 out of federal lands
that were part of the territories of Idaho, Montana, and Wyoming.126
Yellowstone comprises over 2 million acres of unfenced terrain in the
northern Rocky Mountains.127 Bison were not widespread in the Yellowstone region compared to the Great Plains, but there were always
bison in the scattered high-elevation grasslands. Largely due to geographic isolation, the bison in Yellowstone were not hunted to extinction, and today the Yellowstone herd is the only herd in the United
States known to be free of domestic cattle DNA.128 From a low of
about two dozen in 1900, Yellowstone bison population today varies
from 3,000 to 4,000.129
The Yellowstone herd is an anomaly among private and public
herds as it is not fenced and routinely roams outside Yellowstone
boundaries in the winter to find better grazing on lower elevation
lands outside the park.130 These winter range lands are a mosaic of
122. Yellowstone: History of Bison Management, NAT’L PARK SERV., https://
www.nps.gov/yell/learn/management/bison-history.htm (last visited July 6, 2018)
[https://perma.cc/7DMW-RSFB].
123. See id.
124. The Extermination and Conservation of the American Bison, supra note 2, at
S611.
125. Rebirth on the Great Plains, NAT’L WILDLIFE FED’N (Apr./May 1998), https://
nieonline.com/downloads/national_wildlife/wildlife/bison_box.pdf?CFID=59249015&
CFTOKEN=42221205 [https://perma.cc/E4U2-F3AB].
126. Yellowstone: Birth of a National Park, NAT’L PARK SERV., https://www.nps
.gov/yell/learn/historyculture/yellowstoneestablishment.htm (last updated June 4,
2018) [https://perma.cc/NHS5-WCCA].
127. Main, YELLOWSTONE NAT’L PARK, http://www.yellowstonenationalpark.com/
index.html (last visited June 20, 2018) [https://perma.cc/YH4G-6GXD].
128. Julia A. Herman et al., Genetic Analysis of a Bison bison Herd Derived from
the Yellowstone National Park Population, 20 WILDLIFE BIOLOGY 335, 341 (2014),
available at https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2622&context
=icwdm_usdanwrc [https://perma.cc/ES4L-C7JY].
129. Yellowstone: History of Bison Management, supra note 122.
130. Yellowstone: Bison, NAT’L PARK SERV., https://www.nps.gov/yell/learn/nature/
bison.htm (last updated Jan. 4, 2018) [https://perma.cc/YZW8-KSTB].
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private, state, and federal lands.131 The Yellowstone bison carry Brucellosis, a bacterial infection that can be transmitted to domestic livestock and can cause miscarriages, infertility, and lowered milk
production.132 The threat of Brucellosis spreading into private livestock herds by intermingling of bison with domestic cattle just outside
the park has led to conflicts.133
6. American Prairie Reserve: Private Contracting for Wildlife
On the plains of north-central Montana, the American Prairie Reserve (“APR”) is creating a new bison governance structure. The
APR was established in 2001 as a private non-profit organization to
create a working wildlife preserve on the northern Great Plains in
Montana.134 The APR aims to create a reserve of 3.5 million acres
(about 1.5 times the size of Yellowstone National Park) by consolidating private and public land through purchases, leases, and easements.135 To date, the APR has 400,000 acres (“Reserve”).136 Similar
to private wildlife operations in South Africa, APR tends to eliminate
fencing on its Reserve to facilitate large-scale contiguous prairie
habitat.137 One of the key objectives of the APR is to reduce the number of domestic cattle and maintain a bison population.138 Bison were
reintroduced to the Reserve in 2005 and now number approximately
900.139 The APR projects a population of over 10,000 bison by 2030.140
131. See Yellowstone: History of Bison Management, supra note 122.
132. Brucellosis and Yellowstone Bison, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., https://www.aphis.
usda.gov/animal_health/animal_dis_spec/cattle/downloads/cattle-bison.pdf (last visited June 20, 2018) [https://perma.cc/3NZ9-FXLH].
133. Id.
134. Building the Reserve, AM. PRAIRIE RES., https://www.americanprairie.org/
building-the-reserve (last visited May 17, 2018) [https://perma.cc/X7R9-UTDU].
135. Ronald Bailey, Where the Private Buffalo Roam and the Private Antelope Play,
REASON (July 13, 2015), http://reason.com/archives/2015/07/13/where-the-private-buffalo-roam-and-the-p [https://perma.cc/BLG4-KHA4].
136. Building the Reserve, supra note 134.
137. The APR’s work actually mirrors that of South Africa’s “wildlife ranching.”
The law in South Africa grants private ownership of wild species if they are enclosed.
In the last several decades, this has led to a rapid expansion of wild populations on
large private holdings. Cousins et al., Exploring the Role of Private Wildlife Ranching
as a Conservation Tool in South Africa: Stakeholder Perspectives, 13 ECOLOGY &
SOC’Y, no. 43, 2008, at 1.
138. Kyran Kunkel et al., Reintroducing Plains Bison (Bos Bison) To American
Prairie Foundation Lands In Northcentral Montana: 5-Year Conservation And Management Plan, AM. PRAIRIE RES., https://www.americanprairie.org/sites/default/files/
2004%20APR%20Bison%20Reintroduction%20Plan.pdf (last visited July, 6 2018)
[https://perma.cc/GHC2-XVBL].
139. Bison Restoration, AM. PRAIRIE RES., https://www.americanprairie.org/project
/bison-restoration (last visited May 27, 2018) [https://perma.cc/YQ9T-4A62].
140. Id. Bison population growth rates can be as high as 20% per year. Yellowstone:
Questions & Answers About Bison Management, NAT’L PARK SERV. https://
www.nps.gov/yell/learn/management/bison-management-faqs.htm (last updated June
26, 2018) [https://perma.cc/B24T-4Q4V]. Yellowstone notes its herd has grown
10–15% annually for many years. Id.
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The APR’s work is an example of private contracting to establish
wildlife habitat, a practice that has emerged as the relative value of
wildlife has increased. The key to the APR’s ability to create the Reserve is bison’s administration as private property. This governance
allows the APR to buy bison to repopulate the habitat mostly without
interference by the state wildlife agency.141 Figure 5 shows a recent
map of the APR lands and the mosaic of private and public lands
within which they operate.142
FIGURE 5
Map of American Prairie Reserve and
Surrounding Lands, Montana 2018143

7. Caribou: Hunter-Gatherer Governance
The Inuit tribes of northern Alaska and Canada are subsistence
hunters and exploit the caribou populations native to the tundra, bo141. See Bison Restoration Timeline, AM. PRAIRIE RES., https://www.americanprair
ie.org/project/bison-restoration-timeline (last visited Aug. 31, 2018) [https://perma.cc/
95QP-UK7Z]. The APR has, however, faced some resistance from local interests concerned about the changing character of the cattle ranching-based economy.
142. See infra Figure 5.
143. Building the Reserve, supra note 134.
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real forests, and mountainous landscapes.144 While caribou have historically ranged from the west coast of Alaska to the coast of
Newfoundland, the species is not uniformly distributed across this
range—there are many separate herds.145 Indigenous use of caribou
was similar to the native plains tribes’ use of the bison in that the
indigenous managed the nomadic herds communally.146 The caribouhunting Inuit tribes of Alaska and Canada have never been contiguous—now composed of thirteen recognized Alaska-native corporations, primarily the western Subarctic First Nation Governments of
Canada. Some groups even stretch as far eastward as Quebec. For millennia, these tribes were nomads: they followed the large herds on
their annual paths throughout Canada and Alaska. For example, the
western Subarctic tribes in Canada traversed the boreal forests of
Yukon and the Northwest Territories, and the Iñupiat of Alaska traversed the northwestern tundra.147 Unlike their indigenous counterparts in Europe and Asia, these people did not domesticate the
caribou.
8. North American Caribou: Modern Agency Management
With the colonization of the United States and Canada, the Inuit
governance structures gave way to state and provincial controls. In
Alaska, the harvest of caribou is managed by the Alaska Department
of Fish and Game, while in Canada, it is managed by the environmental departments of each respective province, primarily Yukon, Northwest Territories, Nunavut, and Quebec.148 Each department regulates
144. Gates of the Arctic: Subsistence: Preserving a Way of Life, NAT’L PARK SERV.,
https://www.nps.gov/gaar/learn/historyculture/subsistence.htm (last updated July 28,
2016) [https://perma.cc/W2VX-QEQK].
145. Animal Facts: Caribou, CAN. GEOGRAPHIC (July 19, 2006), https://
www.canadiangeographic.ca/article/animal-facts-caribou [https://perma.cc/5SUX28TN].
146. Caribou General, TRADITIONAL ANIMAL FOODS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLE OF
N. AM., http://traditionalanimalfoods.org/mammals/hoofed/page.aspx (last visited July
6, 2018) [https://perma.cc/MLP6-XETV].
147. Cultural and Ecological Value of Boreal Woodland Caribou Habitat, DAVID
SUZUKI FOUND. & ASSEMBLY OF FIRST NATIONS (June 2013), https://www.afn.ca/
uploads/files/report-caribou.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z7WC-PNRL].
148. See Hunting, Trapping, & Shooting, ALASKA DEP’T FISH & GAME, http://
www.adfg.alaska.gov/index.cfm?adfg=hunting.main (last visited July 7, 2018) [https://
perma.cc/MP2L-KVVY] (regulating hunting and subsistence in the U.S. state of
Alaska); Barren-Ground Caribou, YUKON ENVTL. DEP’T, http://www.env.gov.yk.ca/
animals-habitat/mammals/barrengroundcaribou.php (last updated Jan. 26, 2018)
[https://perma.cc/A2BV-3XHB] (regulating hunting and subsistence in the Canadian
province of Yukon); Species Management: Barrenground Caribou, NUN. DEP’T
ENVTL., https://gov.nu.ca/environment/information/species-management (last visited
July 7, 2018) [https://perma.cc/3XZ2-B398] (regulating hunting and subsistence in the
Canadian province of Nunavut); Barren-Ground Caribou, N.W.T. DEP’T ENVTL.
NAT. RESOURCES, https://www.enr.gov.nt.ca/en/services/barren-ground-caribou (last
visited July 7, 2018) [https://perma.cc/XVT2-GCFX] (regulating hunting and subsistence in the Canadian province of Northwest Territories); Hunting-Fishing-Trapping,
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both recreational and subsistence hunting. In Alaska, one must win a
license through a lottery to recreationally hunt caribou or purchase a
tier II permit to strictly subsistence-hunt caribou. The caribou hunting
season in Alaska is generally July through September, while in Canada it is generally August through January.149 These caribou hunts
are subject to bag limits—limits on the number of animals the hunter
may kill and keep. In Alaska, depending on the zone, bag limits may
be as low as one bull per licensed hunter to two caribou of any stock,
while in Yukon, most recreational zones have a limit of one animal.150
9. Porcupine Caribou Herd
The Porcupine Caribou herd is one of the largest caribou herds in
North America.151 The herd ranges in size from 100,000 to 200,000
annually and uses habitat in Alaska and Canada (as shown in Figure
6). The herd migrates between the lands around the Brooks Range in
north-central Alaska to the Richardson Mountains in Canada, and
their summer calving grounds are along the Porcupine River.152 Indigenous people historically hunted the Porcupine Herd for subsistence.153 Because the herd maintains habitat in both the United States
and Canada, the International Porcupine Caribou Board154 was
founded in 1987, the product of an international agreement. This
board consists of four members from both Canada and the United
QUE. DEP’T FORESTS, WILDLIFE & PARKS, https://mffp.gouv.qc.ca/the-wildlife/hunting-fishing-trapping/?lang=EN (last visited July 7, 2018) [https://perma.cc/LD7784GQ] (regulating hunting and subsistence in the Canadian province of Quebec);
Fisheries and Land Resources: Caribou, NFLD. DEP’T FISHERIES & LAND RESOURCES,
http://www.flr.gov.nl.ca/wildlife/caribou.html (last updated May 1, 2018) [https://
perma.cc/MH2Q-BLRF] (regulating hunting and subsistence in the Canadian province of Newfoundland).
149. Know Alaska’s Regulations, ALASKA DEP’T OF FISH & GAME, http://
www.adfg.alaska.gov/index.cfm?adfg=hunting.main (last visited June 11, 2018) [https:/
/perma.cc/5N5W-LSX8].
150. Id.
151. See About the Herd, PORCUPINE CARIBOU MGMT. BOARD, http://
www.pcmb.ca/herd (last visited June 11, 2018) [https://perma.cc/77GY-N5Q6].
152. James E. Heming, The Distribution Movement Patterns of Caribou in Alaska,
ALASKA DEP’T OF FISH & GAME 13–17 (1971), http://www.adfg.alaska.gov/static/
home/library/pdfs/wildlife/research_pdfs/hemming_1971_adfg_tech_bull_1_the_distri
bution_and_movement_patterns_of_caribou.pdf [https://perma.cc/J6YW-WM5E].
153. See The Gwich’in of Alaska and Canada, ARCTIC CIRCLE, http://arcticcircle
.uconn.edu/ANWR/anwrgwichin.html (last visited July 6, 2018) [https://perma.cc/
MJ2B-KRRA]. The Gwich’in people of Canada were one of the traditionally nomadic
tribes and hunted the Porcupine Caribou the longest. Gwich’in Culture, ALASKAN
NATIVES, http://www.alaskan-natives.com/alaskan-native-cultures/gwichin-culture/
(last visited July 6, 2018) [https://perma.cc/8D3Z-VV77]. They ceased nomadism in
1870 to seek permanent settlement. Id.
154. See Canada-US Agreement on Porcupine Caribou Herd Conservation, GOV’T
OF CAN., https://www.canada.ca/en/environment-climate-change/corporate/international-affairs/partnerships-countries-regions/north-america/canada-united-states-porcupine-caribou-conservation.html (last updated Aug. 10, 2017) [https://perma.cc/
WW54-2KVF].
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States who serve as an advisory committee to the regulatory agencies
in each nation.155 The habitat of the Porcupine Caribou herd can generally be described as a mosaic of private and public lands, predominantly the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge.156 The harvest of the
Porcupine Caribou herd is subject to the same regulatory oversite as
most other herds. The dominant governing bodies are the Alaska Department of Fish and Game and the Yukon Environmental Department, whose management structures have been discussed.
FIGURE 6
Porcupine Caribou Herd Population Borders157

10. The Saami Reindeer Culture
The Saami people of northern Europe are the indigenous people of
the Scandinavian Peninsula, Finland, and the Kola Peninsula of Russia. Before the fifteenth century, the Saami people were primarily a
semi-nomadic subsistence hunting culture. But in the sixteenth century, some began herding reindeer in response to assimilation and taxation by their countries.158 The Saami traditionally used the siida
155. Id.
156. See The Gwich’in of Alaska and Canada, supra note 153.
157. Jack A. Kruse et al., Modeling Sustainability of Arctic Communities: An
Interdisciplinary Collaboration of Researchers and Local Knowledge, 7 ECOSYSTEMS
815, 820 (2004).
158. Jesper Larsson, Reindeer Husbandry, Sami Economy and the Evolution of
Common-Pool Resources in Early Modern Northern Scandinavia 1550–1780, 10 (Os-
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system for reindeer husbandry.159 The siida system was a communal
agreement of several families to have individual rights to their respective resources but operate their reindeer herds communally.160 The
Saami herders were semi-nomadic groups that moved with their
marked reindeer across lichen-rich pastures.161 Technological advancements of the mid-twentieth century, such as the snowmobile,
helped ease the burden of such a lifestyle.162 Indeed, before the snowmobile, the Saami traversed the habitat with skis.163
11. Norwegian Pasture Management
The current regime of Norwegian reindeer governance began in
1976 with the passing of the Norwegian Reindeer Herding Act. This
Act gave the Saami the exclusive right to manage reindeer in six distinct pasture areas of Norway and allowed “non-Saami” parties to
herd in concession areas of southern Norway.164 Currently, there are
approximately 3,000 people actively herding reindeer in Norway
across 140,000 square kilometers of the country. Today, herds are still
technically a part of a siida system, however, the “husbandry unit” or
driftsenhet,165 a legal ownership agreement, is owned by a single person or shared amongst spouses.166 The husbandry units lie within districts that partition grazing lands. The partitions are enforced by the
district committee.167 An area board grants requests to move herds
throughout the pasture area, determines grazing times, and comments
on municipal development plans. Beyond the pasture areas, the Ministry of Agriculture’s Reindeer husbandry office drafts reindeer husbandry policy while the Norwegian Reindeer Husbandry Board
executes the policy and day-to-day functions.168 As of 2007, within
each pasture area there are 90 districts169 in the Saami-owned territotrom Workshop, Ind. Univ. 2017), https://ostromworkshop.indiana.edu/pdf/seriespapers/2017spr-res/larsson-paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/4KVK-7A5C].
159. See Johnny-Leo L. Jernsletten & Konstantin Klokov, Sustainable Reindeer
Husbandry, ARTIC COUNCIL 5 (2000–2002), http://www.reindeer-husbandry.uit.no/online/Final_Report/final_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/8D9N-G43J].
160. Id.
161. See Sámi – Norway, INT’L CTR. FOR REINDEER HUSBANDRY, http://reindeerherding.org/herders/sami-norway/ (last visited July 6, 2018) [https://perma.cc/F3CD6LJM].
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. See Scott Forrest, Territoriality and State-Sami Relations, UNIV. OF NORTHERN
B.C. (1997), http://arcticcircle.uconn.edu/HistoryCulture/Sami/samisf.html [https://
perma.cc/5K5H-PY49]. There has been conflict with the current agency-led system of
husbandry. In 1978, a committee of the Norwegian Legislature proposed to terminate
the Husbandry Act and return to the Sami siida system. See Sámi – Norway, supra
note 161.
166. Jernsletten & Klokov, supra note 159, at 5.
167. See Sámi – Norway, supra note 161.
168. Jernsletten & Klokov, supra note 159, at 86–87.
169. Id. at 86.
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ries, and the primary responsibilities delegated to the district committees are containment and separation of herds in the district.
12. Norwegian Wild Reindeer
In Norway, there are also sizeable populations of (non-domesticated) wild reindeer. In a manner of governance analogous to semidomesticated reindeer, wild reindeer lands are partitioned into
twenty-three distinct wildlife areas;170 however, these wild herds generally traverse private and public lands. The herds are managed by
municipal boards that report to the national district committees under
the national environmental directorate.171 Organized hunts and recreational spotting are the most common uses of wild reindeer. The wild
reindeer on the island of Svalbard (also known as Spitzbergen) are
managed similarly to those on the Norwegian mainland in that they
are owned either by those hunting them as game or by the government.172 Unlike on the mainland, however, the Svalbard animals are
not split by regional differences or governed by committee. Their dayto-day management is by the office of Svalbard’s governor, who on
those matters, reports to the environmental directorate in Oslo instead of a district committee.173
13. Reindeer Peoples in Russia
Because the habitat for Rangifer is circumpolar, it is not surprising
that reindeer peoples are found in Russia. Indeed, reindeer husbandry
is more prominent in Russia than anywhere else in the world—approximately two-thirds of the world’s stock of domesticated reindeer
exist in Russia.174 Unlike Norway or other Scandinavian countries,
reindeer husbandry is not the right of the sixteen indigenous groups
who have historically herded reindeer in Russia.175 Instead, the ownership of reindeer in Russia falls into one of three categories: state,
public, or private.176 State ownership consists of those reindeer herded
for agricultural research; it is an experiment-driven ownership.177
With public ownership, the category in which most reindeer fall, the
animals are owned by collective state farms operated by a public en170. Norsk Villreinsenter, The Wild Reindeer Areas in Norway, VILLREIN, http://
www.villrein.no/the-wild-reindeer-areas-in-norway/ (last visited July 6, 2018) [https://
perma.cc/6GP7-4PKA]. The largest wild herd resides in Hardangervidda, totaling
around 7,000 wild animals of the estimated 25,000 total wild reindeer in Norway. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Jernsletten & Klokov, supra note 159, at 23.
175. Id. at 24. The only groups actively engaging in reindeer husbandry in Russia
were indigenous people. Id.
176. Id. at 34.
177. Id. at 35.
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terprise.178 With private ownership, reindeer are generally owned by
clans individually or communally.179 It is difficult to classify reindeer
as privately owned because many individual reindeer owners herd
reindeer for public enterprises; thus, their privately owned reindeer
are herded together with publicly held reindeer.180 Further confusion
arises because there is little discrepancy between state-owned and
publicly owned reindeer. Indeed, the only difference in their management is the use of their resource—not who owns them.181 The difficulty of differentiating between public and private ownership does,
however, answer the question of who owns and manages the habitat—
predominantly public enterprises and the agricultural regulatory system of Russia.182
Historically, the management of reindeer in indigenous Russian collectives only consisted of 20 to 100 individuals, however, under the
public enterprise management system, there exists an entire “herding
brigade” per herd owned by the enterprise.183 There are often bureaucratic conflicts on the local and federal level over husbandry in the
Russian system. The following is illustrative: The Department of Agriculture oversees management for the local Okrug Administration, or
area administration, of the Yamal-Nenets, the State Committee Administration of Land-Use manages the pastures, and all deal directly
with public enterprises but do not work with private reindeer.184 This
effectively means that in the Yamal-Nenets region, there is no regulatory arm or management body controlling private husbandry.185 There
has been a steady decline in the number of domesticated reindeer in
Russia—it is now estimated to be about 1.2 million animals.186
D. Migratory Waterfowl: Biological and Administrative Flyways
In North America there are vast populations of migratory birds that
require continental swaths of habitat as they move north and south in
their annual migrations. Known collectively as “migratory waterfowl,”
these birds nest in the northern reaches of the continent during the
long summer days and spend winter in the mild southern reaches of
the continent.187 These birds primarily belong to the family Anatidae
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 41.
184. Id. at 40.
185. See id. This is primarily an issue in the tundra, while in the taiga, husbandry is
a smaller resource with respect to the peoples’ overall subsistence. Id.
186. Id. at 23. The Russian reindeer population was recently near twice this size. Id.
This decline in population size is most noticeable in the northeastern zone of Russia
where there are communities in which herding is vanishing. See id.
187. See, e.g., Greg Balkcon et al., Waterfowl Management in Georgia, GA. DEP’T
OF NAT. RESOURCES, https://georgiawildlife.com/sites/default/files/wrd/pdf/manage-

\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWL\6-1\TWL102.txt

176

unknown

Seq: 30

TEXAS A&M LAW REVIEW

6-DEC-18

14:49

[Vol. 6

(ducks, geese, brant, and swans) but other migratory species are represented.188 In their biannual migrations, North American waterfowl
populations use “flyways,” which are groups of states and provinces
that together administer their waterfowl resources and support distinct populations of birds.189 Biologists have divided the continent into
four north-south flyways that comprise these habitats: Pacific Flyway,
Central Flyway, Mississippi Flyway, and Atlantic Flyway.190 These
four flyways are shown in Panel A of Figure 7.191
As is clear from the figure, these populations utilize a massive landscape stretching thousands of miles across many states and provinces
in Canada, Mexico, and the United States. The ownership of this landscape is a mosaic of public and private land in tracts ranging from
national parks to small residential lots. In the nineteenth century,
populations were subject to open-access exploitation in a manner described in bottom pathway in Figure 3.192 During this period and in
the early twentieth century, the exploitation led to dramatic reduction
of these populations as hunters supplied meat and feathers to wildlife
markets. Given the enormous number of landowners, neither a private contractual solution nor a state-based regulatory solution was
feasible. In 1916, the United States and Great Britain (on behalf of
Canada) entered into a treaty to protect migratory birds.193 As a result
of this treaty, the regulation of migratory waterfowl hunting is guided
by several Flyway Councils composed of agencies from the appropriate states and provinces. Figure 7 shows maps of both biological and
administrative flyways.

ment/Waterfowl_Management_in_Georgia.pdf (last visited July 7, 2018) [https://
perma.cc/97JP-4KY6].
188. Additional species include: Rallidae (rails, gallinules, and coots), Gruidae
(cranes), Charadriidae (plovers and lapwings), Haematopodidae (oystercatchers),
Recurvirostridae (stilts and avocets), Scolopacidae (sandpipers, phalaropes, and allies), and Columbidae (pigeons and doves).
189. Balkcon et al., supra note 187.
190. Flyways: Administrative, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., https://www.fws.gov/
birds/management/flyways.php (last updated Mar. 8, 2018) [https://perma.cc/VDY8PE5U].
191. See infra Figure 7.
192. See infra Figure 3.
193. Convention Between the United States and Great Britain for the Protection of
Migratory Birds, GR. BRIT.-U.S., Aug. 16, 1916, 39 Stat. 1702.
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FIGURE 7
Migratory Waterfowl in North America
Panel A: Biological Flyways

IV.

Panel B: Administrative Flyways

CONCLUSION

The conservation and management of wildlife continues to be an
important issue in environmental policy. Debates about markets, landowners’ rights, and the role of government are ongoing and often contentious. The comparative institutions approach to wildlife
governance recognizes the wild variation in wildlife institutions and
the role of history and law in determining these institutions. History is
important because it sets a structure for ownership of land (habitat).
Imperfect incentives and institutional “border” problems will always
exist. Increasing relative wildlife value will put pressure on old institutions to change.
The comparative institutions approach to wildlife governance relies
on an examination of the property rights to the habitat and the stocks
of wild populations. The approach recognizes the often-extreme costs
of delineation and enforcement of property rights to wild populations
and their habitats. Thus, all systems are notably imperfect compared
to the typical neoclassical economics approach. These costs arise because wildlife habitat and wildlife populations are part of the land that
has many attributes and uses, most notably, residential and agricultural. The organizations that govern wildlife tend to be ridden with
transaction costs and imperfect property rights, and the most efficient
system is one that maximizes the total value of the package less the
enforcement and administrative costs. An economic framework is developed for considering different governance regimes for both the
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wild stocks and the habitat they require. The cases I examine, especially bison and caribou, show the range of governance regimes that
have been used and how those governance regimes depend on history
and on law.

